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e are mortal creatures. Perhaps we might live human lives 
without seriously confronting death. But while we are alive, Wwe cannot avoid making sense of life's meaning by locating 
ourselves in time. Some will tell elaborate narratives about their past, 
present, and future. Others will look on these hyperorganized ac-
counts with disdain or despair, and content themselves with more 
fragmentary stories. But without any sense of past, present, future, 
we are nothing. 
So much is obvious. But it is less obvious how our ongoing effort at 
temporal self-location shapes thinking about justice. I elaborate 
three temporal horizons that we are continually using to make sense 
of our lives. Each horizon frames time in a different way, irreducible 
to the others. Each is irreplaceable. We must make our peace with all 
three, despite their potential conflicts with the others. As we explore 
two of these horizons, we find ourselves on a path that leads to new 
insights into an old idea-that there is a basic difference between 
corrective and distributive justice. Exploring a third will lead us into less 
familiar, but equally fundamental, terrain: I shall call it the sphere of 
relational justice. 
This tripartite view permits a fresh encounter with more familiar 
monistic and dualistic perspectives. Monists hope to work out a sin- 
gle idea of justice that will fit all kinds of disputes. Some have been 
notoriously simple-minded-as in Benthamite utility maximization 
or ~osneri'an wealth maximization. But there is nothing in monism 
that requires brutal simplicity. You can be as complicated as you like 
in developing your idea of justice-so long as you think that the 
right idea, once elaborated, should apply to all possible cases. 
Dualists have no such expectation. They follow Aristotle and assert 
that justice comes in two varieties-corrective and distributive. John 
Rawls, for example, does not suppose that his famous difference 
principle should regulate our ideas of corrective justice. Robert Noz- 
ickl and many other conservatives have attacked Rawls on monistic 
grounds: If Lwlsian justice cannot be used to inform microdiscus- 
sions of particular cases, why should we trust it to regulate the basic 
structure of society? 
An analogous dispute has been provoked by the rise of the law- 
andeconomics movement over the last generation. This time, tradi- 
' See Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic, 1974), pp. 20413. 
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tionalists tend to be dualists. On their view, lawyer-economists make 
a category mistake when they test the rules of contract, tort, and 
crime by one or another conception of efficiency. Instead, legal de- 
velopments should be guided by the very different commands of cor- 
rective j u ~ t i c e . ~  For lawyer-economists, this move merely mystifies 
potential irrationalities and inefficiencies in the name of an obscure 
label, signifying nothing. 
Disagreements between monists and dualists do not break down 
on political lines: conservatives are not necessarily dualists, liberals 
are not necessarily monists, or the other way round. Despite the an- 
tiquity and intensity of the dispute, we do not seem to have much of 
an idea about what is dividing the two sides. Monists and dualists are 
generally content to accuse one another of moral blindness-for 
monists, dualists are perverse obscurantists; for dualists, monists are 
barbaric simplifiers-without trying to understand why their appar- 
ently intelligent opponents fail to appreciate the error of their ways. 
I shall be suggesting that both sides tend to give priorities to dif- 
ferent time frames, and that both are right in supposing their oppo- 
nents miss something important. Once we understand the dispute in 
this way, we shall no longer be tempted to suppress the insights of ei- 
ther side. It may prove possible to incorporate the insights of both 
schools into a more complex, trinitarian, concept ofjustice. 
I. CLOCK WATCHING 
Let me begin the modern way-by inviting you to look at your watch. 
Unlike the denizens of previous civilizations, it is second nature for 
us to walk around with a device that constantly tells us that time is 
like a line in space. Just as we can subdivide a line into homogeneous 
and infinitely divisible units, we can subdivide the time line by glanc- 
ing at our watch. The only difference is that once we have passed a 
point on the time line, there is no returning. 
Now, you do not have to be Albert Einstein to know that this 
linear analogy between space and time has proved unsatisfactory for 
scientific purposes. But I am not doing science here, or even the phi- 
losophy of science. My aim is to elaborate the temporal frameworks 
used by ordinary men and women to make sense of the meaning of 
their lives. These frameworks provide the context within which these 
same ordinary people seek to realize justice in the law of a democra- 
tic society. 
See, for example, George Fletcher, "Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory," Har-
ward Law h e w ,  ~xxxv(January 1972): 537-73; Ernest Weinrib, "Legal Formalism: 
On the Immanent Rationality of Law," Yak Law Journal, XCVII (May 1988): 949- 
1016. 
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From this viewpoint, the most important event of the twentieth 
century is not the triumph of Einstein, but the triumph of the wrist- 
watch. While modern men and women differ vastly in other respects, 
all are trained to measure out their lives in clock beats. It is one 
thing to arrive habitually late for appointments; quite another to 
refuse to wear a wristwatch or look at a clock. Such a blank stare 
would mark a person off as an alien presence: either she is a recent 
arrival from Mars or a philosophy student momentarily in the grip of 
John McTaggart's proof of time's unreality. 
This essay does not try to vindicate clock time against its radical 
critics. I shall be struggling against a more common reaction. We 
sometimes take clock time so seriously that, despite Einstein, we sup- 
pose that it describes the nature of ultimate reality, that it is the only 
"real* way we can talk about time and its passage. But if we think 
about how we actually live out our lives, it is surprisingly easy to 
loosen the grip of the wristwatch upon our time consciousness. 
I do not deny that the time line provides modern men and women 
with an irreplaceable temporal framework. But it is not the only 
form in which time, and its passage, appears to us. In contrast to 
clock time, these other forms are neither infinitely divisible nor ho- 
mogeneous. They are nonetheless very real. 
11. THE LnTED PRESENT 
We live in the present. Each time we awake, we are thrown into the 
world of the now, and we cannot escape the task of interpreting the 
meaning of what is going on. Right now, for example, I am writing 
this line, and you are now reading it. 
The present, for us, is not an infinitely small point on a line, but a 
structured experience. The key is recognition of change-whenever 
I notice that something significant has happened, this recognition 
serves to reframe my understanding of what is going on right now. 
Insignificant things do not matter. As you read this essay, the sig- 
nificant event is the word or phrase. You are not aware, nor should 
you be, of the clock time it takes to decode a single letter-unless, of 
course, you reinterpret the nature of your structured activity and ex- 
perience this essay as a challenge to identify the letters of the alpha- 
bet. Even then, your lived present would not be infinitely divisible 
into clock time. As you happily called out the letters on the page, 
you would be failing to notice many changes occurring at a different 
rate. While a clock can measure the passage of a nano-second, this is 
too short for a human being to focus his attention and begin to 
make sense of the world in which he finds himself. 
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So much for the lived present. A lot more can be said,5 but despite 
my brevity, I am sure that you know what I am talking about. Rather 
than explore the now at greater length, I want to describe three ways 
of making sense of the now by placing it into longer, but differently 
constructed, temporal horizons. As I display each horizon, I shall 
also suggest how it shapes our sense ofjustice in a different way. 
111. LIVED EXPERIENCE 
First (and foremost?), each of us frames the now by placing it against 
a background of lived experience. I am now reading an essay, or 
playing baseball, or working on an assembly line. Each of these expe- 
riences lasts longer than the now, but none lasts too long. For one 
thing, their duration is limited by an internal understanding of the 
particular experience: if, say, I am playing baseball, and I strike out 
to end the ninth inning, I have come to the end of the game. While I 
may remember my experience a minute later as I brood about my 
strikeout in the shower room, I am perfectly aware that I am now 
"taking a showerH-a different experience altogether. 
In contrast, when I went up to bat in the ninth inning, I was still 
experiencing the same game I started in the first inning--even if the 
game began several hours ago. It is the internal structure of my on- 
going activity, not clock time, that marks off one lived experience 
from the next. 
While an activity's internal structure is important, human physiol- 
ogy also imposes constraints. 'Let's stop for lunch' generally serves to 
call a halt to whatever we were doing; when we pick up afterward, we 
experience ourselves as starting up anew-the lunch break typically 
interrupts the sense of continuous engagement in a developing 
structure of experience which is the hallmark of the first temporal 
horizon. It is possible, of course, to defer termination of a lived expe- 
rience by refusing to eat or sleep and by focusing attention on it 
alone. But soon enough, it will prove impossible to evade the de- 
mands of the body; and when you awake from your fitful slumbers, 
you will be opening your eyes to new lived experience(s)-even if 
they occur in the very same sequence as yesterday's. 
The familiar rhythms of lived experience shape a first under- 
standing of the demand for justice. Begin with the simple point that 
each lived experience is understood as having a structure: a set of 
expectations about the way in which one now can appropriately 
evolve into the next. If I am reading a philosophical essay, I may 
' My own thinking begins with the brilliant, if obscure, work of Edmund Hus- 
serl's On the Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, John Barnett Brough, 
trans. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991). 
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plan to read one paragraph and then the next; if I am working at 
McDonald's Restaurant, my expectations have a more complicated 
structure, allowing for more-but not infinitely more-appropriate 
ways in which my actions at one time may evolve into my experience 
at the next. 
This elementary point suffices to formulate a basic question of 
justice: since each of your lived experiences has a structure, each is 
vulnerable to disruption. For example, you are now trying to make 
sense of this essay. Suppose Shmoe disrupts this effort by blasting a 
loud horn within earshot: What in the world, you say, is going on? 
Who does Shmoe think he is? What gives him the right to blast away 
at the structure of my lived experience? 
Notice how naturally this temporal horizon frames the characteris- 
tic concerns of corrective justice. Your questions cannot be assimi- 
lated into some general complaint about the way society as a whole is 
organized. The problem is not society but Shmoe, and his disruptive 
behavior. 
Not that Shmoe will find it impossible to answer your questions 
about his actions. Most fundamentally, he may deny his responsibility 
for the disintegration of your structured expectations-pointing, for 
example, to the fact that a third person, Blow, forced him to play his 
horn at gun point. In this case, you have misdirected your com- 
plaint, and had better redirect it appropriately. 
Worse yet, you may find that there is nobody responsible for 
the disruption. After all, the world has not been organized to 
guarantee the integrity of all your lived experiences-you may 
simply be the victim of misfortune. Even if you can locate the re- 
sponsible ac to r (~) ,  he may plausibly respond with an excuse or 
justification for his conduct-perhaps he did not notice you sit- 
ting quietly in the shady corner, or perhaps he was sounding a 
fire alarm, or.... 
My aim is not to appraise any of these responses-this is the task 
of a full-blown theory of corrective justice. I am concerned with 
the temporal horizons that make these theories significant. From 
this point of view, the most important-and appealing-thing 
about corrective justice is its principled refusal to abandon the 
frame of lived experience, its insistence on understanding the 
problem of justice in terms that make sense within the narrow 
temporalities in which life is actually experienced from day to day. 
Rather than seek relief from disruption in the reorganization of 
social processes whose character only displays itself over larger 
tracts of time, corrective justice focuses remorselessly on the par- 
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ticular people who disrupt particular experiences at particular mo- 
m e n t ~ . ~  
Even within these confines, it focuses narrowly on those particular- 
ities which illuminate individual responsibility for the disruption. It 
generally casts a blind eye on whether Shmoe is rich or poor, but 
closely scrutinizes whether he noticed your presence in the room be- 
fore putting the trumpet to his lips. It is the latter, not the former, 
that singles Shmoe out from your perspective of lived experience. To 
make this point, I shall say that the accent ofjustice within this time 
frame is on the responsibility of persons, with different approaches to 
corrective justice elaborating different variations on this theme. 
For all the trendy talk about the "socially contingentn nature of 
human reality, it is hard to imagine how homo sapiens might dis- 
pense with the habits of experiencing life in chunklets of an hour or 
two, and of responding with outrage when others disrupt their pat- 
terned expectations about the way these chunklets "normally" 
evolve. It is this sense of outraged expectation which fuels the de- 
mand for corrective justice. 
Indeed, corrective justice would be the only meaningful kind of 
justice if the structure of lived experience provided us with the only 
way we could ever understand the meaning of life. But it does not. 
IV. RELATIONSHIPS 
Particular experiences can be interesting, boring, or profoundly re- 
vealing. But they gain new meanings when we organize them into 
patterns that unfold over longer periods of time-patterns that I 
shall call relationships. 
Imagine, for example, that I teach a particularly bad class--disor- 
ganized and obtuse, I lose touch with the concerns of my students. 
Retreating to my office in disarray, I place my recent pedagogic dis- 
aster into a larger pattern of activity: After all is said and done, am I 
a third-rate teacher? To answer, it is not enough to fixate upon my 
most recent lived experience. I must weigh the meaning of the other 
episodes that make up my past teaching activities: Remember how I 
managed to encourage that anxious but brilliant student to realize 
her potential? And there was the time that .... 
While the search for the responsible actor begins with the disruption of a par- 
ticular lived experience, it may not end there. Instead of blowing his horn in my 
presence, Shmoe may program his computer at Time, to emit a blast just as I am 
studying my book at Time,. In such cases, actions at earlier moments become rele- 
vant-but only so far as a theory of corrective justice can link them up appropri- 
ately to the moment of disruption. It is this latter time frame which continues to 
serve as the decisive reference point. For a classic treatment, see H.L.A. Hart and 
Tony Honore, Causation in the Law (New York: Oxford, 1985, 2nd ed.). 
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Each element in this story may point to a particular lived ex- 
perience; but the meaning and value I give to the activity point 
beyond particulars-to narratives that relate them into larger pat- 
terns of meaning. To put my point in a slogan: I live out my partic- 
ular experiences but I tell a s t 0 9  about my relationships. In the 
story I tell myself, I may be a good teacher despite bad classroom 
experiences from time to time, or vice versa. Indeed, words like 
'good' and 'bad' hardly suggest the moral complexities involved in 
the ongoing effort to assess the implications of particular experi- 
ences for the stories we tell ourselves about our ongoing relation- 
ships. 
Most importantly, the value of particular experiences is not ex- 
hausted by the role they play in our stories that seek to place them 
into larger temporal patterns. Even if I am convinced I am a good 
teacher, this does not somehow cancel out the badness of particular 
experiences. Similarly, I may make a mess out of a relationship and 
yet recall certain shining experiences. While the two temporal hori- 
zons are complexly intertwined with one another, their value cannot 
be reduced to one another. But if this is true of one's personal life, is 
it also true about justice? 
I shall explore the matter by considering the ongoing revolution 
of our gender morality. Certain aspects may be readily expressed 
within the horizon of lived experience. For example, if we all took 
seriously the idea that our sexual partners had the right to say 'no' to 
our advances, this important step would not require the definition of 
a distinctive time horizon. It simply redefines the Shmoe-like behav- 
ior that should count as disruptive of another's expectations about 
the structure of particular lived experiences. 
But other aspects of the gender revolution can only be understood 
against the more extended horizon of meaningful relationship. Con- 
sider, for example, the typical situation of a woman who wishes to 
gain professional recognition as a first-rate lawyer or professor or car 
mechanic. Suppose that the men in her environment are not disrup- 
tive in any of the familiar abusive ways-they do not hurl sexual in- 
sults or demand sexual favors, much less assault or rape. They may 
even respond to her with labored politeness. To make things hard 
for ourselves, suppose that when payday comes around, our hypo- 
thetical woman worker is highly compensated, in full recognition of 
her contributions to the institution's marginal revenue product. She 
has only one problem: her fellow workers do not take her seriously. 
But what precisely does this mean? 
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Assume, for example, that a lady lawyer attends strategy session af- 
ter strategy session in which the affairs of clients are discussed; on -. 
each occasion, she talks about as much as most participants, and no- 
body interrupts; but her contribution is never taken up by others in 
the subsequent give-and-take. Within the lived experience of each in- 
dividual session, there is nothing odd about this fact. Everybody has 
been at meetings at which his or her contribution goes unnoticed- -
even if it actually has a good deal of merit. The problem arises only 
when our not-so-hypothetical lawyer puts the episod6s into narrative 
form; only then does the pattern emerge that is the object of her 
grievance. These guys just are not taking her seriously! 
Despite her hefty paycheck, she is a victim of injustice. If you 
agree, we cannot express this judgment within the temporal horizon 
of corrective justice. We require a new idea-that justice requires us 
to respect each others' right to tell stories of a certain kind about 
our ongoing relationships. 
Having taken this step, two paths open before us. One is conse- 
quentialist: if her fellow workers began to take her contributions seri- 
ously over time, perhaps the woman would rise to new professional 
heights, and (after a transition) perhaps the law firm would find it- 
self better off in terms of profits and camaraderie. 
But perhaps not. It is, alas, perfectly possible that once her col- 
leagues began taking her seriously, they would find lots to criticize 
about aspects of her performance which they had formerly disdained 
to notice; or perhaps the woman, having gained the professional 
recognition she had long sought, concludes in despair that "success" 
in the activity was not worth the long years of sacrifice it required. 
Nonetheless, even if the woman only gains misery upon winning pro- 
fessional recognition, the men were doing her an injustice in with- 
holding it. Here, as elsewhere, the utilitarian account fails to express 
the categorical character of judgments of injustice: the wrong done 
to the woman goes deeper than the fact-specific balancing of costs 
and benefits allows us to appreciate. 
Rather than guess at probable outcomes, we should look to the 
way the work environment suppresses a fundamental human capac- 
ity-the capacity to project the meaning of one's life over time by 
telling a story that includes meaningful participation in relation- 
ships. Without such a capacity, it would simply be impossible to live a 
human life. A social environment that denies a woman this possibil- 
ity strikes at a crucial dimension of human dignity-one that is no 
less fundamental than the horizon of lived experience protected by a 
concern with corrective justice. 
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Just as corrective justice vindicates the very possibility of meaning- 
ful lived experience, so too relational justice vindicates the very 
possibility of meaningful participation in ongoing activities. If cor- 
rective justice requires each of us to act responsibly and avoid the 
wrongful disruption of lived experience, relational justice requires 
us to act responsibly by fairly recognizing the contributions others 
make to ongoing enterprises in which we participate. If we refuse to 
recognize this duty, we deny others their claim to dignity as fellow 
creatures in the search for a meaningful life. 
Of course, a lot of questions must be resolved in the elaboration of 
this core idea:' Does it embrace the organization of the family, religion, 
sport, as well as work? In what ways should respect for the contributions 
of others be manifested? When, if ever, may participants legitimately 
waive their right to something I will call a dign@d relationship? 
But let us complete the view of the forest before glancing at a few 
trees. A third horizon awaits. 
V. LIFE CHANCES 
Think of yourself writing your autobiography. Surely, you would re- 
flect on particular lived experiences that were decisive. You would 
also organize these, and many other, experiences into narratives that 
define larger patterns of enduring relationship. But your life story 
could not be reduced to any single relationship, let alone a particu- 
lar experience. An adequate autobiography would reveal the intri- 
cate interplay of experiences and relationships that express the 
complex meanings of your life as a whole. 
Within this life-time framework, a different question of justice 
takes center stage. Like all mortals, you have struggled for meaning 
in a world you did not create. You did not choose your parents, or 
your education, or the material and transactional resources with 
which you began life as an adult. Yet these resources have transpar- 
ently shaped the life story you tell in your more autobiographical 
moments. If you had begun life with different resources, you would 
have had different experiences, engaged in different relationships. 
Have you, then, been unjustly handicapped--or advantaged-from 
the start? 
This is the question that motivates liberal theories of distributive 
justice and accounts for certain characteristic features that can oth- 
erwise easily be parodied. The first is their high level of abstraction. 
Since we are scrutinizing the distribution of basic resources out of 
which people build the meaning of their lives, the analysis will avoid 
This idea lies a t  the foundation of Catharine MacKinnon's argument in her 
Sexual Harrassment of Working Women (New Haven: Yale, 1979). 
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the examination of particular lived experiences or relationships- 
since, by liberal hypothesis, people should be free to organize them 
in the way they think best. Second, this temporal horizon also ac- 
counts for the theories' principled neutrality as to the nature of the 
good life: if basic resources are given out fairly, it is up to each of us 
to write our own autobiographies-for good or for ill. It is not for 
the liberal state to proclaim an authoritative answer to the mystery of 
life, and distribute resources on this basis. 
I deny, however, that this abstract and antiteleological characteri- 
zation justifies the familiar charge that liberal distributive theories 
presuppose an "unencumbered self," whose dignity can somehow be 
detached from life's experiences and relationships. On the contrary, 
it is precisely because human dignity can only be achieved through 
experience and relationships that distributive justice seems a matter 
of crucial importance. Since our particular experiences and relation- 
ships are profoundly shaped by our initial claims to basic resources, 
those claims had better be allocated in a justifiable way. In focusing 
on the distribution of initial endowments, liberal theories do not 
presuppose an unencumbered self; they simply suppose an autobio-
graphical self, a self that can look back over the shape of her life and 
recognize that its starting point and subsequent development was 
profoundly shaped by political decisions allocating economic and 
cultural resources. 
Indeed, thoughtful people who do take a radically "unencum- 
bered" view of the self and its dignity-whether that view be based 
on Stoic or Christian or Buddhist or Kantian sources-have never 
been at the forefront of the struggle for social justice. For these peo- 
ple, a concern with such matters is part of the problem rather than 
part of the solution: since it is (they claim) an illusion that our suc- 
cesses and failures in the world of experience really matter for the 
salvation of our souls, it really does not matter how much or how lit- 
tle we have been given in terms of basic resources. The only impor- 
tant thing is to seek a spiritual state of radical detachment from the 
things of this world. Within this framework, a passionate commit- 
ment to distributive justice is merely a snare and delusion, leading 
one to place undue importance on worldly matters that are obstacles 
to salvation. 
But this is hardly the spirit of modern liberalism. Whatever my 
differences with communitarians, they are not to be found in a 
dispute on the metaphysical relationship between the self and the 
world. Like any communitarian, I am happy to insist that selves 
gain value only through their encounter with experience and 
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their reflection on their relationships. My disagreement arises 
only in response to a less metaphysical, but hardly unimportant, 
question: Who has the right to interpret the authoritative mean- 
ing that individuals give to their lived experiences and particular 
relationships? 
For liberals, each person should be recognized as the authoritative 
author of her own autobiography. The fact that each person draws 
her life story from a particular community's legacy of language, prac- 
tice, and tradition does not imply that she is any less the author of 
her own meanings in life. On the liberal view, the state oversteps its 
authority when it denies the legitimacy of this crucial act of selfdefi- 
nition. 
In contrast, communitarians look with ironic distance upon each 
person's fragmentary and erratic efforts to construct a life story 
through ongoing processes of experience, relationship, and autobio- 
graphical reflection. Such Sisyphean labors should not blind us to 
the way individuals may casually destroy the legacy of collective 
meanings that make their puny efforts possible. 
It follows that the communitarian has no principled objection to 
distributive decisions made in an avowed effort to preserve collective 
ideals of the good life that sustain the individual's search for mean- 
ing. For liberals, the state has overstepped its bounds when it distrib 
Utes more basic resources to those who are expected to live out their 
lives in accordance with its scripted versions of meaning in life. Such 
state-sponsored teleologies offend basic liberal commitments as they 
are elaborated within the temporal frame each of us adopts at our 
autobiographical moments. 
To put this point in parallel with my others: just as the horizon of 
lived experience frames a concern with corrective justice which empha- 
sizes the centrality of the responsibility of persons, and the horizon of 
meaningful activity frames a concern with relational justice which em- 
phasizes the dignity of persons, I shall say that the autobiographical 
horizon frames a concern with distributive justice which emphasizes 
the J i - e e h  of each person to interpret the meaning of her own destiny. 
Even if this liberal framework for distributive justice were ac- 
cepted, there are the usual difficulties in working it up into an inci- 
sive theory. Rawls has one way of proceeding. Nozick has another. I 
have my own opinions. But at least we are clearer why liberals find 
the question worth asking. 
VI. CONFLICTING TEMPORALITIES 
"Responsibility," "dignity," "freedomn: I have introduced these three 
liberal ideals, and the way they emerge from three temporal hori- 
310 THEJOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 
zons, one at a time. But when we put the horizons together, do they 
yield a consistent whole? 
This question arises on at least two levels. The first implicates 
philosophical anthropology: Is there a consistent image of human 
life that organizes the three aspects of liberal justice as they are re- 
fracted by the temporal horizons? 
A second involves the nuts-and-bolts construction of one or an- 
other theory of justice. As the theorist tries to understand the 
sources of a particular conflict, she is well advised to place it against 
the interpretive background provided by each of the three horizons. 
But each temporal framework may offer conflicting diagnoses of the 
just resolution of the dispute: ideals of responsibility may point in 
one direction, principles of dignity in another, notions of freedom 
in a third. When this happens, how to decide which temporal frame 
should be most salient? 
Taking this second question first, I concentrate on the ways in which 
framingparadoxes, as I shall call them, would arise even in an ideal 
world-in which all inhabitants were willing and able to build a polity 
that perfectly complied with liberal principles. In adopting this coun- 
terfactual premise, I do not wish to divert attention from the deeply en- 
trenched injustices of the real world. I adopt my idealizing posture only 
to suggest that even in the unlikely event that liberalism triumphed de- 
cisively in the world, it will still have things to wony about 
1.Reframing the meaning of lived experience. Imagine an ideal liberal 
world in which initial resources were justly distributed and where 
well-informed entrepreneurs and consumers operated in a compet- 
itive market e ~ o n o m y . ~  Considering your range of options, you 
have decided to open a McDonald's and devote your working life 
to customer service. Picture yourself happily flipping hamburgers 
when Shmoe enters and deliberately tries to destroy this experi- 
ence and, with it, the means of your economic livelihood. Stipulate 
further that Shmoe is just plain nasty: though you have done him 
no wrong, he has no other mission in life but to make you miser- 
able. 
He succeeds: thanks to him, and him alone, your hamburger flip 
ping comes to an end. This is the stuff of corrective justice-however 
much particular theories disagree on other matters, this looks like a 
paradigmatic case: Shmoe has done you wrong through intentional 
actions that have no other motive than sheer maliciousness. Until I 
add some further facts. 
I frame this characterization of the liberal market ideal abstractly to embrace a 
broad range of particular theories. 
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Stipulate that Shmoe has not hired a goon squad to scare away 
your customers, but has opened up his own Hamburger Heaven 
next door out of pure spite. Driving down his prices, he drives you 
out of business, chortling loudly as the gas company shuts off your 
hot plate,7 and you leave the premises in despair. Do you still think 
he has done you wrong? Do you think that the liberal state should 
authorize you to sue him for compensatory (or punitive) damages? 
These questions expose a tension between two horizons. From the 
vantage point of lived experience, the paradigmatic wrong is mali- 
cious and intentional disruption. Within the horizon of relationships, 
the episode has a different meaning-at least if you and Shmoe un- 
derstand yourselves as engaged in the distinctive activity called entre- 
preneurship. Within this temporally-extended frame, we expect to be 
judged over time by how well we take advantage of opportunities 
opened up by the market-hence it is not wrong if you go under be- 
cause somebody else has decided to undercut your price. 
Even Shmoe's jubilation takes on a different appearance: Just as 
the baseball players who win the World Series jubilate on the field af- 
ter their triumph, is there anything really wrong when Shmoe trum- 
pets his own victories in the "game" of free competition? At worst, 
Shmoe has acted in bad taste, exhibiting emotions hidden beneath a 
veneer of polite concern by those with better breeding. 
Is Shmoe, then, a loud boor or a monster of injustice? Perhaps this 
is not a problem that cannot be resolved cleanly one way or the other. 
I shall express this continuing sense of irresolution by saying that 
thoughtful partisans of one or another answer suspend rather than dis-
miss the objections raised by their opponents. Suppose, for example, 
that liberal citizens resolve the framing paradox by passing a law that 
allows Shmoe to escape from legal liability: 'Whereas people should 
have the right to relate to one another as competing entrepreneurs 
in a market economy, they have the right to cut prices even when in- 
tentionally inflicting foreseeable harm upon other competitors ...." 
Most thoughtful advocates of this law will retain a capacity to experi- 
ence the shock of injustice as they view the malignant Shmoe triumph- 
ing over his hapless victim. Thus, they will not find it possible to dismiss 
the proponents of corrective justice who find Shmoe's willful disruption 
morally wrong. Instead, they want to suspend this judgment as they focus 
on the way price cutting appears within a relational time frame: If entre- 
preneurs find it meaningful to relate to one another as participants in a 
' Some might be impressed by the fact that it is the gas company, rather than 
Shmoe, that is the direct cause terminating your job. If you are one of them, stipu- 
late that Shmoe owns the gas company. 
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market economy, should the liberal state not respect their right to tell 
this story about themselves? If price cutting is a significant part of this 
story of competitive prowess, why should the state seek to ban it? 
On the other hand, those who would pass a statute condemning 
Shmoe for "cut-throat competition" or "predatory pricing" will also 
be aware of a distinctive normative undertow. While they may insist 
that Shmoe is doing something wrong, they may find it difficult to 
blind themselves entirely to the stories entreprdneurs tell one an- 
other as they compete for business in the marketplace. In their view, 
however, these stories should not allow us to tolerate behavior that 
would otherwise be condemned within the frame of lived experience. 
Although most of us tend to one of these suspensive views, I do not 
deny the existence of thoughtful people who are downright dismissive. 
Strong deontologists often suggest that intentional maliciousness can 
neuer be outbalanced by the beneficial consequences of activities. Unfor- 
tunately, they do not test the rigors of their doctrine by looking the 
Shmoes of capitalism in the face and telling us how they would run an 
economy that did not tolerate countless acts of intentional, short-run, 
harm doing. They write as if their critique of utilitarianism only had bite 
in crisis situations arising in war or other grave emergencies8 Perhaps 
they can maintain the credibility of their rigorous doctrine only 
by blinding themselves to many of the cases that it would con-
demn? 
This is, at least, the opinion of classical utilitarians, who have re- 
cently been reinforced by the American school of lawyer-economists. 
These analysts turn the tables on deontology by refusing to take seri- 
ously the frame of lived experience and by focusing all their atten- 
tion on the extended frame of meaningful relationship. For them, 
the legitimacy of the marketplace serves as a paradigm for the analy- 
sis of other problems of conflict. If, as they suppose, the short-term 
cruelties of the marketplace are readily justified by a longer-term 
view of the benefits, a similarly expansive approach is appropriate 
when it comes to assessing other areas of social life. 
From this perspective, it is naive to condemn a relationship merely 
because it looks morally unattractive at a particular point in time. Al-
most every activity worth doing has its unattractive moments. The 
question is whether these bad patches are outweighed by the good 
ones that the activity generates at other times. If the answer is 'yes', 
See, for example, Judith Jarvis Thomson on trolleys, in The Realm of Rights 
(Cambridge: Harvard, 1990), chap. 7; Bernard Williams on wartime atrocities, in 
"A Critique of Utilitarianism," in J.J.C. Smart and Williams, Utilitarianism: For and 
Against (New York: Cambridge, 1973), pp. 98-100. 
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the right thing to do is to transcend the primitive moralisms of lived 
experience and embrace the activity with all its imperfections-so 
long, at least, as you have taken steps to minimize the bad and maxi- 
mize the good it generates over time. By the simple act of transwalu-
ing time horizons, we have shifted decisively away from deontology 
toward maximizing cost-benefit analysis. 
But is it really necessary for us to continue dismissing one another 
in these familiar ways? On the one hand, the utilitarian is surely right 
in pointing out the naiveti of fixating on bad moments without giving 
credit to the good an activity can produce. On the other hand, the de- 
ontologist is right to point to the special terror we feel when some rival 
intentionally disrupts our lived experiences without even attempting 
to justify his actions by appealing to principles of corrective justice. 
Rather than dismiss either of these points, liberal public policy 
should aim to express the moral insights expressed on both sides of 
the framing paradox. For example, we should allow entrepreneurs 
to drive their competitors out of business, but require them to pay a 
special tax to cushion the unemployment that their intentional be- 
havior predictably causes. 
I suspect that similar straddles are also available in other areas of 
social policy. 
2. Reframing the question of dignity. A different kind of straddling is 
in order when confronting a second framing paradox. This one 
arises when we juxtapose the relational horizon against the life-story 
perspective we adopt in our autobiographical moments. 
I introduce the paradox as it might appear from the vantage of 
ideal theory. To fix ideas, suppose that each citizen of our ideal state 
receives a liberal education introducing her to a broad range of life 
options, that each begins adult life with a roughly equal share of 
~ e a l t h , ~and that each is held responsible for disruptive behavior by 
a system of criminal and civil law rooted in a sound understanding of 
corrective justice. 
Citizen Freedom emerges from her period of tutelage to consider 
the job choices that are offered up to her in a competitive market- 
place. After surveying her full range of choices, Freedom narrows 
her options down to two: a dignified workplace in which her fellow 
workers treat her contributions with the respect they deserve and 
I try to justify these, and other basic entitlements, in my Social Justice i n  the Lib 
era1 State (New Haven: Yale, 1980). Other liberal theories understand distributive 
justice differently, but in many cases, these differences will not change the basic 
structure of the framing paradox of interest here. 
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which pays a salary of $35,000 a year; an undignified competitor, in 
which the little ladies are treated in a polite, but unserious, manner 
by their male colleagues--even though they are paid $40,000! 
This is not as impossible as it may sound. To use economic jargon, 
all it requires is that some men gain enough "psychic income" from 
machismo that they are willing to sacrifice enough dollars so as to of- 
fer Citizen Freedom a deal on undignified terms.1° Stipulate further 
that Freedom acts under conditions of perfect information-she is 
carefully told what the terms of the deal involve. After weighing the 
matter, Freedom accepts the offer of undignified employment-tak- 
ing the bigger paycheck and salving her ego with a fancy mink coat. 
Unless, of course, the citizenry intervenes to make this kind of 
transaction illegal. If the woman had not consented, liberal princi- 
ples would indeed condemn organizations that stripped her of her 
dignity. Does the bare fact of her consent make such a big differ- 
ence? 
My own answer emphasizes the distinction between ideal theory 
and real-world conditions. When considering the question as it 
would arise in an ideal liberal state, you should not assume that Citi- 
zen Freedom has received an illiberal education which sought to in- 
doctrinate her in a life of feminine subordination; nor should you 
assume that Freedom comes from the lower classes and chooses the 
higher income because she has been unfairly deprived of a roughly 
equal starting point in life. These real-world factors do give rise to a 
very powerful argument in favor of banning dignity-stripping 
arrangements, even those reached by knowledgeable adults in unco- 
erced settings. Quite simply, given the existing injustices in the distri- 
bution of educational and material resources, do we want to allow 
Citizen Freedom to reinforce by her conduct the idea that there is 
nothing wrong with stripping women of their dignity? 
But such questions are excluded by definition in my idealizing 
thought experiment, which challenges us to consider whether, even 
in an ideal world, Freedom should be barred from stripping herself 
of her own dignity as a worker by trading it for cash. I answer by af- 
firming the value of freedom over dignity: when push comes to 
shove, I place the highest value on the freedom of each citizen to or- 
ganize activities and experiences into a life story that she finds mean- 
ingful. If Citizen Freedom knowingly sacrifices her dignity on the job 
' O  This theme is elegantly explored (without too many moralizing words like 
'dignity')by Robert Frank in Choosing the Rzght Pmd (New York: Oxford, 1985). 
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to gain resources for the more meaningful pursuit of other activities, 
it is not for the state to say that she is wrong. 
Of course, one should make very sure that there is a real conflict 
between freedom and dignity before allowing the latter to be sacri- 
ficed. Consider prostitution-a paradigmatically undignified activity 
as it is generally practiced. Doubtless, many prostitutes are driven to 
the activity by unjust conditions of poverty and inadequate educa- 
tion. Others do not know what they are in for. While all this,justifies 
a great deal of regulation, I do not think it justifies an outright ban. 
If a twenty-year old with a good education decides to make money 
off her body by selling it to partners (who do not physically abuse 
her), she should be treated as the ultimate author-ity in the matter. 
Even in the real world, legitimate concerns for dignity should never 
eliminate the possibility of freedom. 
But let us return to ideal theory, and probe more deeply into the 
framing paradox. Suppose now that Citizen Freedom goes further, 
and announces her intention to enslave herself totally and forever to 
a master. Must the liberal state allow her to strip her claims to dig- 
nity so completely? 
Many of my friends respond by refusing to answer. After all, they 
point out, we are dealing in ideal theory, and therefore should s u p  
pose that Freedom has begun life with her fair share of basic re- 
sources. Under such conditions, it is almost impossible to suppose 
that she will "voluntarilyn choose slavery. 
I agree that it is unlikely, but it is always a mistake to underesti- 
mate human freedom, and its variety of uses. Ideal theory is ideal in 
its grant of equal freedom to all; it does not guarantee that citizens 
make an ideal use of their freedom. Let us stipulate, then, that one 
of our fellow citizens announces her intentions to become a slave- 
for-life-if only to expose the shallowness of liberal ideals. Does she 
have this right to strip away her dignity? 
Begin by distinguishing this extreme case from the others we have 
considered--on two dimensions. First, most dignity-stripping cases 
allow the stripper to change her mind after a relatively short period 
of time. Recall my earlier hypothetical case involving a woman 
worker trading $5,000 in salary for undignified treatment. If she tires 
of this deal, she remains free to change her life story by changing to 
a job that promises lower pay for more dignity. Second, most other 
cases involve piecemeal stripping of dignity in one activity, leaving 
the citizen free to write a dignified autobiography by emphasizing 
her other activities and experiences. 
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In contrast, the slavery-for-life case involves a person who is com- 
pletely stripping herself of her author-ity. She is denying that she is 
the sort of creature who takes responsibility for writing an autobiog- 
raphy." 
I would draw the line at this point, and refuse to recognize the le- 
gitimacy of the action. Of course, if somebody were grimly deter- 
mined to disclaim all author-ity, there may be precious little we can 
do in practice to stop her-other than to make i t  clear that we would 
prevent the master from maintaining his dominion if she should 
ever express the desire to take up her life again as a free citizen of 
the liberal state. 
In any event, my aim here has not been to resolve such paradoxes, 
but to urge you to consider them with greater care. 
VII. METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS O F  LIBERALISM 
In a recent essay,12 I reaffirmed my faith in political liberalism-so 
long as one did not take its promises of liberation from metaphysics 
and epistemology too seriously. While political liberals try, as a mat- 
ter of principle, to evade contestable matters of first philosophy, they 
do not suppose they can altogether avoid such confrontations. 
This essay has pointed to one of these necessary encounters. No 
serious theory of justice can evade the ancient dispute between 
monists and dualists. It arises whenever the debate becomes self-re- 
flexive and considers the basic structure of the idea of justice itself. 
While monists have the advantage of Ockham's Razor-Why make a 
difficult subject more complicated than necessary?--dualists succeed 
in raising nagging doubts about the adequacy of any monistic con- 
ception to do justice to our considered convictions. 
Rather than repeat pat dualistic formulae, I have tried to reflect 
upon fundamental aspects of the human condition and show how 
they may motivate a trinitarian response. Since the problem of jus- 
tice only arises amongst creatures endowed with time consciousness, 
I have searched for an answer by elaborating a more general account 
of the struggle for meaning in time, seeking to show how it might 
enlighten our particular problem. 
I have tried to conduct this search in the spirit of political liberal- 
ism-providing just enough metaphysics to motivate a thoughtful an- 
swer without indulging elaborate metaphysical conceits that 
needlessly alienate people who might otherwise embrace liberalism's 
" Compare Hany Frankfurt's treatment of the wanton in his "Freedom of the 
Will and the Concept of a Person," this JOURNAL, LXVIII, 1 (January 14, 1971): 10- 
14. 
l 2  "Political Liberalisms," this JOURNAL, XCI, 7 (July 1994): 364-56. 
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key commitments. Despite the wild diversity of outlooks held by the 
citizens of a modern society, are there really lots of people out there 
who fail to recognize the relevance of the three temporal horizons- 
lived experience, meaningful relationship, life story-which frame 
their search for meaning in life? I do not think so. 
If my thesis is novel, it lies in the effort to link this spare meta- 
physic to the problem at hand. In making this link, I do not claim 
that the three temporal horizons are themselves sufficient to solve 
the trinitarian problem of justice they reveal. Merely because all of 
us struggle for meaningful experiences/relationships/lives, it does 
not follow that we all adopt the same principles of justice when our 
struggles for meaningful experiences/relationships/lives conflict 
with one another. 
As we reflect on the framing paradoxes that ensue, liberals may 
find it necessary to probe more deeply into the metaphysical founda- 
tions of the selfs encounter with time. In my brief introduction to 
framing paradoxes, I have suggested my own strong priority to the 
self s struggle for a meaningful autobiography over the claims of par- 
ticular relationships and lived experiences. But I shall leave a more 
extended defense of this priority to another time. 
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